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Abstract
Pandemics can cause immense disruption and damage to communities and societies. Thus
far, modeling of pandemics has focused on either large-scale difference equation models like the
SIR and the SEIR models, or detailed micro-level simulations, which are harder to apply at
a global scale. This paper introduces a hybrid model for pandemics considering both global
and local spread of infections. We hypothesize that the spread of an infectious disease between
regions is significantly influenced by global traffic patterns and the spread within a region is
influenced by local conditions. Thus we model the spread of pandemics considering the con-
nections between regions for the global spread of infection and population density based on the
SEIR model for the local spread of infection. We validate our hybrid model by carrying out a
simulation study for the spread of SARS pandemic of 2002-2003 using available data on popula-
tion, population density, and traffic networks between different regions. While it is well-known
that international relationships and global traffic patterns significantly influence the spread of
pandemics, our results show that integrating these factors into relatively simple models can
greatly improve the results of modeling disease spread.
1 Introduction
Modeling of the spread of infectious disease typically falls into one of two categories. Analytically
tractable models like the SEIR model are capable of capturing some globally important phenomena
like the rate of spread of diseases using few parameters. However, they have a hard time reflecting
differences in global spread due to local conditions. For example, it can be difficult to model
different rates of spread in countries with different population densities and public health policies
of variable strength and coordination. Network- or agent-based models are capable of reflecting
details of individual conditions. However, modeling large-scale global disease-spread using such
models often runs into methodological problems like overfitting because of the vast number of
possible parameters.
This paper proposes a granular, network-based hybrid model of disease spread in which individ-
ual regions are modeled as nodes in the network, and the spread of disease within nodes is modeled
analytically (using a simplified derivative of the SEIR model) with the help of demographic pa-
rameters like population density. The properties of the network as a whole, like connectivity, are
determined using real data on traffic between regions. We demonstrate the power of this approach
by simulating the spread of SARS . One of the key takeaways is that the level of granularity has
a significant effect on the success of network- or agent-based simulation models. For example,
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we show that modeling China as an individual node is unsuccessful, whereas breaking it up into
constituent regions gives an impressive match to real infection data on SARS.
One of the great advantages of our model is its parsimony: it contains relatively few tweakable
parameters compared with general agent-based models. At the same time it is capable of repro-
ducing the important broad flows of disease. However, it is important to remember that exact
reproduction of historical data is not the end-goal. Exceptions that do not correspond to real data
provide insight into specific local phenomena that influenced the progression of a pandemic, such
as an actual timing of the first infected case in a country.
1.1 Related Work
There is a vast literature on understanding the spread of disease using analytical and simulation
models. In the next section we give a brief overview of the most common modeling methodologies,
including differential equation models and simulation models, but here we discuss related research
more generally. The most closely related to this work can be grouped into two categories. First,
several researchers have simulated and analyzed the local spread of SARS in 2002-2003 [20, 23, 50].
In particular, Huang, et al reproduce the situations in Singapore, Taipei, and Toronto individually,
and compare with the actual transitions [20]. This also ties in to a significant existing literature
on local modeling of historical pandemics, like the Influenza during the First World War (e.g.
[6, 26]). Other examples also abound: Jenvald, et al use a virtual city based on Linko¨ping, Sweden,
considering the number of schools, age distribution, and household type [21]; Longini, et al model
population and contact processes based on Thailand census data, demographic information, and
social network data [25]; Kelso, et al model a real community in the south west of Western Australia
[22, 27].
The second category involves simulating global infection spread using international traffic data.
For example, several papers use air travel data to estimate connectivity in a network [8, 9, 14,
15]. However, these authors typically simulate a hypothetical global pandemic, with a focus on
intervention policies; the focus of our research is to validate the simulation with real historical
data.
Much existing research simulates infection in networks with reasonable properties, but not
necessarily based on existing real-world data. For example, Bailey simulates epidemics in two
dimensions, such as square grids [1]. Patel, et al [39] and Weycker, et al [43] consider hypothetical
populations of 10,000 persons, comprised of five communities of equal size, containing schools and
neighborhoods. Vespignani, Pastor-Satorras, and co-authors simulate spreading infectious diseases
with complex networks[2, 28, 36, 35, 38, 37]. Carrat, et al [5], Glass, et al [18], and Eubank [13]
also use generated complex networks for simulation.
Another major theme of research has been on the effects of prevention and/or mitigation strate-
gies. These typically compare a “base” simulation and an alternative simulation which considers
some proposed strategy. For example, Longini, et al use stochastic epidemic simulations to in-
vestigate the effectiveness of targeted antiviral prophylaxis to contain influenza [24]. Kelso, et al
simulate the effect of social isolation, such as school closure, individual isolation, workplace nonat-
tendance, and reduction of contact [22]. Carrat, et al explore the impact of interventions, such
as vaccination, treatment, quarantine, and closure of schools and workplaces [5]. Germann, et al
simulate and compared the baseline and several combinations of mitigation methods [17]. Patel, et
al use genetic algorithms to find optimal vaccination strategies [39]. Weycker, et al estimate the
population-wide benefits of routine vaccination of children [43].
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Figure 1: SARS Map: Cumulative number of reported cases as of April 8, 2003 [47]
1.2 The SARS Pandemic
The SARS pandemic of 2002 is a useful case study for our modeling methodology. The pandemic
spread to 29 countries/regions in 2002 and 2003. In total 8,096 people were infected and 774 people
died as of December 31, 2003 [48]. Figure 1 shows the spread of SARS as of April 8, 2003 [47].
In 20 of 29 countries/regions, 100% of total cases in the country were “imported” (as defined by
WHO) from other countries [16].
The SARS pandemic is a particularly useful case study because we have high-fidelity data on
the outbreak. First, the beginning and end of the pandemic are clear. According to the WHO,
the first case was a male in his 40’s in Guangdong, China, in November 2002. SARS started
substantially spreading from Hong Kong to other countries in February 2003, infecting 29 countries
and regions by July 2003. After that, there were no new cases except one infection through a
laboratory accident. Second, the number of cases is clearly reported (and relatively small). WHO
reported the cumulative number of cases and the number of new infected cases from March 17th
to July 11th 2003 [45]. Third, the number of infected countries is clearly shown. There are 29
countries/regions which are infected by SARS by the end of 2003 [48]. Thus we have good data on
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the progress of infection in different countries and regions.
2 Modeling the Spread of Disease
We first introduce the main methodologies for modeling the spread of infectious diseases before
describing our approach in detail.
2.1 Infectious Disease Models
2.1.1 SIR Model
The classic SIR model, proposed by Kermack and McKendrick in 1927 [3], posits three classes
of agents; Susceptible, Infectious, and Removed. Susceptible agents (hereafter denoted S) are
vulnerable to a disease and have the potential to be infected. Infectious agents (I) are currently
infected and have the risk of infecting S. Removed (R) agents are removed from the system – they
are either dead or acquired immunity.
Thus R is not infected again. R is also called Recovered when we assume it is not dead. When
R is not dead but has instead acquired immunity, the total population, (S + I + R), is constant.
The model assumes that agents in the set S are sometimes infected by a contact in I and change
to R at a constant rate. This yields the expressions below for the transition of populations of these
three classes.
dS
dt
= −βSI
dI
dt
= βSI − λI
dR
dt
= λI
(1)
where β is the rate of infection from S to I and λ is the rate of recovery from I to R. λ is inversely
proportion to the average infectious period, τ : λ = τ−1. When we assume that the population is
constant in this case, the total population N is given by S + I + R. When β/λ > 1, the infection
spreads since the probability that S becomes I is greater than the speed that I becomes R. The
basic reproduction number, R0, is the average number of persons infected by a single infected
person when the population has no immunity and no control against the infection [49]. In the SIR
differential equation model, the basic reproduction number is given by R0 = Nβ/λ. If one infected
person infects more than one susceptible person (i.e., R0 > 1), secondary infection occurs and the
infection spreads. On the other hand, if R0 ≤ 1, the disease converges in the system. Therefore
R0 = 1 is a threshold for spread.
2.1.2 SEIR Model
The SEIR model is a derivative of the SIR model. SIR doesn’t consider the incubation period.
Thus, when S is infected, it becomes I immediately and starts to infect other S [44]. In the real
world, there is some duration between the time that a person is infected and the time that he/she
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starts infecting others. The SEIR model denotes agents in the incubation period as belonging to
class E (exposed) [19]. The corresponding transition equations are:
dS
dt
= −βSI
dE
dt
= βSI − λE
dI
dt
= λE − λI
dR
dt
= λI
(2)
2.1.3 Network- and Agent-Based Models
Agent-based modeling provides an explicit, local method of understanding the spread of infection. It
allows for fine-grained control over many aspects of the dynamic model of disease spread, including
geographic factors and agent movements. For example, Carley, et al [4] simulate the spread of
anthrax and Epstein [12] investigates the spread of smallpox with agent based models. Deguchi,
et al have developed an Agent Based simulation language called SOARS, Spot Oriented Agent
Role Simulator [11, 10] for simulating the spread of disease considering modules such as human
activities, opportunity for contact between people in a society, disease state, and intervention to
control the spread.
Network-based models typically represent agents as nodes on graphs and allow the connectivity
structure of the graph to determine the possible spread of disease. For example, extending an SIR
model to networks would involve allowing a susceptible vertex S to be infected by an infectious
vertex I only if S is adjacent to I. Network-based models are useful in that they can reflect social
and economic networks. People’s behaviors and social contacts build the network and the infection
route is on the network.
2.2 Our Approach
Our model uses local regions and interconnections between them. There are three possibilities for
a new infection in a region; (1) infection from travelers from outside the region, (2) infection from
returning travelers, and (3) infection from local persons. We denote infection types (1) and (2) as
“global” infections and type (3) as “local” infections. Figure 2 shows the basic structure of our
model.
Global and Local Infections We assume that infection starts in a particular country or region
and spreads from there. At each cycle, infections of all types can occur. Global infections (types 1
and 2) occur with frequencies that are dependent on the level of travel between regions, and local
infections are mostly dependent on the population density of a region (details of the data used
are below). Our local model is based on the concept behind the SEIR model. We consider the
same four types of agents in each region: Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Removed. When an
infection occurs, agents are considered exposed. The model proceeds in time cycles t. The number
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Figure 2: Structure of the simulation model
of agents newly exposed in region i at time t through the global infection mechanism is modeled
as EGi(t) =
∑
j Ij(t) · Tij · P ∗G(t), where the sum is over other regions, Tij is the sum of travelers
from region i to region j and the number of travelers from region j to region i (since infection can
occur through both arriving and returning travelers), and P ∗G(t) is a “global infection coefficient”
at time t, described below.
Local infection follows a similar process, so that the number of agents newly exposed through
the local infection mechanism at any time t is given by ELi(t) = Si(t) · Ii(t) · P ∗Li(t) where P ∗Li(t)
is a “local infection coefficient” (similar to the global infection coefficient, both are described in
detail below).
It is assumed that agents go from exposed to infectious according to some incubation period
that is disease-specific, and, similarly, from infectious to removed according to some disease-specific
recovery period. For the purposes of this paper, we set these to 10 for both incubation period and
infectious period, but these parameters can of course be varied for modeling other diseases.
Infection probabilities As awareness of a disease spreads, it is likely that heightened awareness
and prevention measures start to reduce the spread of infection. We model this in our global and
local infection coefficients, by introducing a term that dampens the coefficient over time. For global
infection, we use P ∗G(t) = PG−(DG ·t) where PG is a basic global infection coefficient, held constant
across regions, and DG models the dampening effect.
We use a similar equation for the local infection coefficient, P ∗Li(t) = PLi− (DL · t). In this case,
DL is assumed constant across regions, but the basic local infection coefficient PLi is region-specific,
given by PLi = ρi ·C1+C2 where ρi is the population density of region i, assumed to be the primary
driver of high local infection rates.
It is worth noting that the original SEIR model gives a similar type of equation for newly exposed
agents E = β · S · I, where β is the infection rate. The main novelty here is the combination of
modeling a declining infection rate, and treating each region separately.
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3 Calibration With Data
There are several model parameters that need to be calibrated using real data. It is useful to
consider some background information on the characteristics of SARS in this context.
Characteristics of SARS The SARS Coronavirus causes general infection with Viremia, es-
pecially severe pneumonia and intestine infection. It is transmitted primarily through droplet
infection. Due to its resistance to dryness, it can also be transmitted through air. It is thought
that the incubation period of SARS is usually 2-10 days and the average is 5 days [32]. In the
pandemic of 2002-2003, most countries reported a median incubation period of 4-5 days, and a
mean of 4-6 days. In the incubation period, it is unlikely an infected person will spread the disease
through droplet infection. The infectious period is thought to be about two weeks, with its peak
from the 7th-10th day after infection [32]. Transmission efficiency appears to be greatest from
severely ill patients who are experiencing rapid clinical deterioration, usually during the second
week of illness. Maximum virus excretion from the respiratory tract occurs on about day 10 of
illness and then declines to 0% by day 23. There are no reports on transmission beyond 10 days of
fever resolution [42]. The death rate varies by age group (SARS affects older patients much more
severely), but the overall death rate was about 9.6% in the 2002-2003 SARS pandemic, significantly
higher than that of seasonal Influenzas. Another notable feature of SARS is that it is believed that
“super-spreading” events, where a person infects many more than the average rate of infection,
are a key component in its transmission. Our model does not deal explicitly with such levels of
granularity, which may lead to some outlier predictions in areas where the law of large numbers
does not take over. This is discussed further in Section 5
3.1 Correlation between Pandemic and Traffic
It is thought that the origin of SARS was Guangdong in China, quickly spreading to Hong Kong.
Thus we consider countries/regions which have strong relationships with China and Hong Kong.
At first we examine the numbers of travelers from China and Hong Kong and consider the ten
countries/regions where the number of travelers to and from China and Hong Kong is the largest
(see Table 1), yielding a total of 17 countries. 16 of these 17 countries/regions were infected by
SARS. Since there were 29 countries/regions in total with reported cases of SARS, half of them
are represented in this table. Besides these 16 countries/regions, there are 13 other infected coun-
tries by SARS; Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kuwait, New Zealand, Ireland, Romania,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. We focus on these 30 countries/regions in our experi-
ments. There are 8 countries/regions which had local spread: China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Canada,
Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, and Mongolia. 7 of these 8 are included in Table 1.
3.2 Correlation between Local Infection and Population Density
We hypothesize that population density of an area is positively correlated with the local infection
rate, because higher population densities lead to more frequent contact. We test this hypothesis
using data from Chinese provinces, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the most significant infected regions.
Figure 3 shows how the number of infections in different Chinese provinces varied greatly at the peak
of the infection (from [31]), which makes it necessary to treat the individual regions separately. Since
97% of infections occur in 6 provinces, we use data from these 6. They are Guangdong Province
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Table 1: Top 10 countries/regions in terms of number of travelers from/to China and Hong Kong in
2003 (dark-gray: country with local infection, light-gray: country with only imported cases, white:
country without local Infection or imported cases, Created based on [33, 34])
From To
China Hong Kong China Hong Kong
To No. To No. From No. From No.
Hong
Kong
5,692,500 China 58,770,063 Hong
Kong
58,770,063 China 5,692,500
Macao 1,431,294 Macao 1,218,648 Macao 18,757,267 Japan 563,300
Vietnam 693,423 Thailand 649,920 Taiwan 2,731,897 United
States
532,500
Russian
Federa-
tion
679,608 Taiwan 287,312 Japan 2,254,800 Taiwan 407,100
Thailand 624,214 Japan 260,214 Korea,
Republic
of
1,945,484 United
Kingdom
235,100
Singapore 568,510 Singapore 226,260 Russian
Federa-
tion
1,380,650 Korea,
Republic
of
225,200
Korea,
Republic
of
513,236 Korea,
Republic
of
156,373 United
States
822,511 Australia 196,900
Japan 448,782 Philippines 139,753 Philippines 457,725 Singapore 184,200
Malaysia 350,597 United
Kingdom
131,000 Malaysia 430,137 Philippines 178,700
Germany 268,057 Australia 129,292 Mongolia 418,257 Macao 156,100
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Figure 3: Map of SARS cases by province in China as of May 18, 2003 [31]
(the initial infected province), Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, Hebei Province, and Tianjin Municipality. Table 2 shows basic data on population and
density for each of the provinces, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Using these 6 provinces, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between population
density and infection rate at the 0.01-level. We choose the values for C1 and C2 by trial and error.
3.3 Passenger Traffic
Our initial simulations are focused on the 6 regions of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Table 3
shows the number of travelers among the three countries. However, it is difficult to estimate travel
between the regions of China, or to allocate travelers from China to the other countries amongst
the regions of China.
In order to approximate this travel information, we use data on passenger land traffic and civil
aviation in China in 2007 [30]. Table 4 shows the each passenger traffic and the total [30]. We use
land traffic data for the 6 provinces we are interested in, as shown in Table 5 [30]. We compute the
share of each region in the total, where the total share is 100.
Then, based on Tables 4 and 5, we approximate the number of travelers between two regions
by assuming that the share of a region is directly proportional to the number of travelers to the
region. Also we assume that the share of passenger traffic by air is proportional to the share of
passenger traffic by land.
We estimate travel between the different regions of China and Hong Kong and Taiwan by using
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Table 2: Population, area, and population density in 6 provinces in mainland China, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan [29, 40, 41]
Population Area Population Density
(sq. km) (per sq. km)
Beijing 17,422,637 16,801 1,037
Guangdong 83,079,300 177,900 467
Hebei 68,135,100 187,700 363
Hong Kong 6,708,940 1,108 6,055
Inner Mongolia 23,660,000 1,183,000 20
Shanxi 33,398,400 156,800 213
Taiwan 23,067,604 36,006 641
Tianjin 11,760,000 11,760 1,000
Table 3: Number of travelers between the three regions in 2003 [33, 34]
China Hong Kong Taiwan
China - 5,692,500 NA*
Hong Kong 58,770,063 - 287,312
Taiwan 2,731,897 407,100 -
Row: Origin, Column: Destination
*Civil travel from China to Taiwan was not permitted
in 2003 (Lifted on July 18, 2008)
Table 4: Total passenger traffic in China in 2007 [30]
Railways Highways Waterways Civil Aviation Total (Total of Land)
Passengers 135,670 2,050,680 22,835 18,576 2,227,761 (2,209,185)
(10,000 persons)
Share in Total (%) 6.09 92.05 1.03 0.83 100 (99.17)
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Table 5: Passenger traffic by region in China in 2007 (civil aviation traffic is not included) [30]
Passengers Share in Total (%)
(10,000 persons)
Beijing 16,190 0.732849005
Tianjin 6,829 0.309118965
Hebei 88,886 4.023496235
Shanxi 43,866 1.985620174
Inner Mongolia 38,678 1.750778371
Guangdong 199,162 9.015179308
Others 1,815,574 82.18295794
National Total 2,209,185 100
Table 6: Passengers passing through the main airport in 6 regions of China in 2007 [7]
Passengers Share in Total (%)
Beijing 55,938,136 13.7859
Tianjin 4,637,299 1.1429
Hebei 1,043,688 0.2572
Shanxi 4,312,910 1.0629
Inner Mongolia 2,121,905 0.5229
Guangdong * 54,835,981 13.5143
Others 282,872,185 69.7138
National Total 405,762,104 100
*Including both Guangzhou airport and Shenzhen airport
the share of the airport of each region in China in the national total. Table 6 shows the number
of passengers using the main airport in 6 regions of China and the share in the national total [7].
We apportion the number of travelers between China and Hong Kong or Taiwan according to the
share. For example, the share of Beijing airport in the national total is 13.7859%. The number of
travelers from China to Hong Kong is 5,692,500. The number of travelers from Hong Kong to China
is 58,770,063. Thus the total number of travelers between China and Hong Kong is 64,462,563.
The number of travelers between Beijing to Hong Kong is obtained as; 0.137859 × 64,462,563 ≈
8,886,700.
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Table 7: Parameter values in simulation
Parameter Value
PG 2.0× 10−7
PLi Depends on Densityi, C1, and C2
DG 5.0× 10−9
DL 2.5× 10−7
C1 7.23× 10−9
C2 7.69× 10−6
Incubation Period 10
Infectious Period 10
Run Cycle 100
Densityi See Table 2
Populationi See Table 2
Tij See Table 8
4 Results
4.1 Results for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
For the preliminary experiment, we simulate with 6 regions in the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan. The number of susceptible agents in each region/country is initially equal to the
population of each country. Table 7 shows the summary for parameter values used in simulation.
These simulation parameters were chosen to provide a good fit to data from this initial simulation,
but we discuss below several inferences that can be made because many of the parameters are
constant, exploiting the granularity of the model. Then, in the second part of this section, we use
the same parameters to extend the model to 30 countries/regions, which provides a test for the
parameters, allowing us to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks in a validation setting.
Figure 4 show the transition of the number of infected cases and the number of cumulative cases
respectively, comparing real data and the results of our model. For the model we show data from
time cycles 45 through 75. The results of China’s 6 regions are summed up and the total is shown
for China.
The figure shows that our model captures both the dynamics of the spread of SARS, as well as
the total numbers, very well. The peaks come in order: Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan. The model
achieves this without using any special parameters that vary in different countries. Populations,
densities, and travel data are all taken from the real world. The SARS epidemic started spreading
from Hong Kong and immediately reached mainland China. The peak of Hong Kong comes earlier
than that of China since the population density is higher. However, the curve decreases from some
point because the percentage of susceptible agents in the population decreases and the percentage
of Recovered agents increases. Then the number of Infectious agents decreases. After that, the
number of infected agents in China increases. Because of its population, the number of infected
agents at its peak in China is the largest among the three countries/regions. The peak in Taiwan
is slightly delayed because of the time lag in the infection reaching Taiwan.
Region-wise Breakdown Figure 5 shows the predicted (from the model) and actual number of
cases for each of the eight modeled regions. While the fit is good for several of the most important
12
Figure 4: Three country model for dynamics of the spread of SARS (left) and the cumulative
number of cases (right), comparing reality and model predictions
(in terms of number of cases) regions, and therefore the overall numbers are good, there are some
discrepancies for some of the regions that had a relatively fewer number of cases. Specifically, the
model underpredicts the number of cases for some of the less densely populated provinces of China
(Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Hebei) and overpredicts for one of the more densely populated regions
(Tianjin). There are idiosyncratic events associated with the spread of any pandemic, so it is not
entirely surprising that some of the results do not match perfectly. The next section considers
anomalies in more detail, where some data is available. But it is important to note that the level
of granularity in modeling is very important. Figure 6 shows the difference in the model in two
cases: one where the six infected provinces in China are modeled independently, and one where
the six provinces are aggregated into one, using aggregated data on population density, travel etc.
The figure clearly shows that the more granular model is a much better fit to the data.
4.2 Modeling 30 Countries/Regions
As mentioned above, we use the parameters from the 8 region/country simulation to extend the
model to 30 total countries (35 region/countries, since we continue to divide China into 6 regions).
Again, we use real population, density, and international travel data from the 27 new countries (for
Canada and Vietnam we use only Toronto and Hanoi, since only these regions had local spread
cases [16]). Table 8 show the expected number of travelers between countries/regions. We again
apportion the number of travelers between each region in mainland China and other countries based
on the share of each region.
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Figure 5: Total cases predicted in simulation and in reality for the eight modeled regions
(a) Modeling the 6 provinces independently (b) Modeling the 6 provinces as an aggregate
Figure 6: Model predictions for total infection in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan when splitting
the 6 infected provinces versus aggregating them into one for modeling
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Table 8: Expected number of travelers between countries/regions, 2004 (from [33][34])
Origin
Destination Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Guangdong Hong Kong
Beijing 0 1,009,387 13,140,321 6,484,244 5,717,286 29,449,654 8,886,773
Tianjin 1,009,387 0 5,542,547 2,735,034 2,411,533 12,421,773 736,718
Hebei 13,140,321 5,542,547 0 35,604,996 31,393,629 161,708,110 165,808
Shanxi 6,484,244 2,735,034 35,604,996 0 15,491,550 79,796,745 685,183
Inner Mongolia 5,717,286 2,411,533 31,393,629 15,491,550 0 70,358,368 337,103
Guangdong 29,449,654 12,421,773 161,708,110 79,796,745 70,358,368 0 8,711,676
Hong Kong 8,886,773 736,718 165,808 685,183 337,103 8,711,676 0
Taiwan 376,618 31,222 7,027 29,038 14,286 369,197 694,412
Australia 58,114 4,818 1,084 4,481 2,204 56,969 326,192
Canada 42,295 3,506 789 3,261 1,604 41,462 233,432
France 127,391 10,561 2,377 9,822 4,832 124,881 64,800
Germany 67,562 5,601 1,261 5,209 2,563 66,231 88,100
India 33,121 2,746 618 2,554 1,256 32,468 114,770
Indonesia 37,595 3,117 701 2,899 1,426 36,855 205,328
Ireland, Republic of 1,746 145 33 135 66 1,712 0
Italy 26,404 2,189 493 2,036 1,002 25,884 571,866
Japan 372,714 30,898 6,954 28,737 14,138 365,371 823,514
Korea, Republic of 338,958 28,100 6,324 26,134 12,858 332,279 381,573
Kuwait 548 45 10 42 21 537 14
Macao 2,783,184 230,727 51,928 214,587 105,575 2,728,346 1,374,748
Malaysia 107,632 8,923 2,008 8,299 4,083 105,511 220,027
Mongolia 70,114 5,813 1,308 5,406 2,660 68,733 380
New Zealand 15,084 1,250 281 1,163 572 14,787 61,247
Philippines 67,519 5,597 1,260 5,206 2,561 66,188 318,453
Romania 2,345 194 44 181 89 2,299 0
Russian Federation 284,026 23,546 5,299 21,899 10,774 278,430 3,585
Singapore 130,496 10,818 2,435 10,061 4,950 127,924 410,460
South Africa 8,472 702 158 653 321 8,305 18,600
Spain 4,089 339 76 315 155 4,009 21,500
Sweden 6,899 572 129 532 262 6,763 0
Switzerland 11,890 986 222 917 451 11,655 45,642
Thailand 124,024 10,282 2,314 9,562 4,705 121,581 790,020
United Kingdom 49,123 4,072 917 3,787 1,863 48,155 366,100
United States 135,080 11,198 2,520 10,415 5,124 132,418 646,612
Vietnam 113,573 9,415 2,119 8,757 4,308 111,336 3,264
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Figure 7: Infection route of SARS in simulation
Figure 7 shows the infection route in our model. Most countries are infected from Hong Kong
or Guangdong. Some countries are infected from other regions. For example, Vietnam, Mongolia,
and Russia are infected from Beijing.
Figure 8 shows the comparison of the number of cumulative cases in simulation with real data.
Especially for the significantly impacted countries, the number of cases corresponds well. In the real
world, there were 8 countries/regions which had local spread. In the model, 18 countries/regions
develop local spread. There are four true statistical outliers in the data in terms of number of cases
predicted by the model versus number of cases experienced in reality. These are Singapore, Macao,
Canada, and Japan.
Discussion of anomalies We hypothesize that the outliers in this case are related to the nature
of the spread of SARS. An early, chance outbreak, in a country or region can lead to significantly
more cases than expected. Similarly, if a country manages to avoid a case of SARS for longer than
predicted by international travel data, heightened awareness and prevention strategies will lead to
many fewer cases than expected. For SARS in particular, this factor may be particularly important,
because there is considerable evidence that some people infected with SARS are “super spreaders”
who may affect the trajectory of the spread. While an infected person infects, on average, 1-3
people [32], some infected people pass the virus to many other people [16]. Although it is not clear
what causes someone to become a super spreader, it is suspected that a person who has a chronic
16
Figure 8: Comparison of number of cumulative cases in 30 countries/regions ((a) Top 6 coun-
tries/regions, (b) 24 other countries/regions). Note the different Y axes.
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illness such as diabetes is more likely to be a super spreader [32]. The origin of SARS is a case in
point. A physician became ill on February 15th 2003 after caring for patients who had developed a
strange new form of pneumonia in Guangdong. He stayed at the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong on
February 21st. On March 4th, he died of what would later be called SARS. During his one-night
stay at the Metropole Hotel, the SARS virus had passed to at least 15 other guests at the hotel.
The virus then spread around the world, leading to outbreaks in other countries [16].
In each of the outlier cases, where the model makes a significantly different prediction than
the actual trajectory of the pandemic, it turns our that the first reported case happened at a
different time than would statistically be predicted by travel flows. While Macao, Japan, and
Republic of Korea have large numbers of travelers from/to China and Hong Kong. these countries
experienced much less infection than predicted by the model. It turns out that each of these
countries experienced its first infection at a much later date than predicted, as shown in Table 9.
Republic of Korea imported the first case in April 25th, Macao imported the first case in May 5th
2003, and Japan was never infected. These countries imported their first cases one or more months
after Vietnam, Canada, Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines. Meanwhile, Canada, despite being
less strongly linked by travel to China and Hong Kong, was infected on February 23rd, early in the
pandemic (in fact, from the original super-spread event at the Metropole Hotel).
To provide some more weight to this hypothesis, we ran the model, but this time using the actual
time of first infection in the country rather than travel data. Other than that, the parameters of
the simulation remained the same. Figure 9 shows that the cumulative number of cases from the
model then correspond better to real data.
Local Considerations Our model trades off adaptability to local conditions for a smaller number
of parameters to fit. This can have several effects. Here we discuss two of them, and how they
might affect the results. First, if we look at data from seasonal flu cases, we find that Canada
typically has a large number of cases, and the United States has the largest number of influenza
isolates [46]. Both of these suggest that the local infection coefficient may be higher in Canada and
the United States than other countries. Indeed, this could have been an additional factor in the
surprisingly large number of Canadian cases. However, the United States was surprising, because,
although it imported 27 cases, the infection did not spread locally. This may indicate that the
quarantining and isolation measures employed worked effectively.
A second interesting point is that Singapore and Vietnam both report many fewer cases than
predicted by the model. This may be partly explained by their lower propensity to spread infection,
again as evidenced by seasonal flu data. There may also have been a significantly bigger push to
hospitalize and keep patients confined, weakly evidenced by the fact that the proportion of those
infected who were healthcare workers in these two countries (41% and 57% in Singapore and
Vietnam respectively) was much higher than other countries (21%).
5 Discussion
We have discussed a hybrid network and local model for the spread of pandemics, and applied
it to the case of SARS. When parameters are calibrated to real data on populations, densities,
and traffic, we show that the model reproduces many of the key dynamics of the spread of SARS
in 2002 and 2003, while remaining parsimonious, and therefore useful for understanding the root
causes of why pandemics spread in the way they do. Both the successes and the failures of the
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Table 9: Infected countries/regions and the date of onset (dark-gray: country with local infection,
light-gray: country with only imported cases) [16]
Country Date of Onset: Imported Cases Total Cases Percentage of
First Probable Case Imported Cases
China 16-Nov 2002 NA 5,327 NA
Hong Kong 15-Feb 2003 NA 1,755 NA
Viet Nam 23-Feb 1 63 2
Canada 23-Feb 5 251 2
United States 24-Feb 27 27 100
Taiwan 25-Feb 21 346 6
Singapore 25-Feb 8 238 3
Philippines 25-Feb 7 14 50
Australia 26-Feb 6 6 100
Ireland, Republic of 27-Feb 1 1 100
United Kingdom 1-Mar 4 4 100
Germany 9-Mar 9 9 100
Switzerland 9-Mar 1 1 100
Thailand 11-Mar 9 9 100
Italy 12-Mar 4 4 100
Malaysia 14-Mar 5 5 100
Romania 19-Mar 1 1 100
France 21-Mar 7 7 100
Spain 26-Mar 1 1 100
Sweden 28-Mar 5 5 100
Mongolia 31-Mar 8 9 89
South Africa 3-Apr 1 1 100
Indonesia 6-Apr 2 2 100
Kuwait 9-Apr 1 1 100
New Zealand 20-Apr 1 1 100
Korea, Republic of 25-Apr 3 3 100
India 25-Apr 3 3 100
Macao 5-May 1 1 100
Russian Federation 5-May 1 1 100
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Figure 9: Comparison of number of cumulative cases in 30 countries/regions considering actual
time of first infection ((a) Top 6 countries/regions, (b) 24 other countries/regions)
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simple model provide insights into pandemic spread. For example, it is clear that it is important
to model international traffic to understand the pathways of spread. At the same time, for any
particular pandemic, individual idiosyncrasies can come into play. For example, the importance of
super-spreaders in SARS is reflected in the fact that the time of first infection in a country has a
big role in how many people get infected. The other major takeaway from this work is that the
level of granularity in the network structure of the model has a significant impact. For example,
treating China as one large entity leads to poorer prediction, but at the same time specializing all
the way down to cities would end up requiring too much data to accurately calibrate the model,
and would probably not provide significantly better prediction.
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